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EDITOR’S NOTE
The NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW is pleased to present the following
Letter in response to the Jeffrey Omar Usman analysis of United States of
America v. Daniel A. Seeger. Mr. Usman’s analysis appeared in V. 83,
Number 1 of the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW.
Because the letter is a personal document, the LAW REVIEW somewhat
suspended its usual editing process to preserve the author’s work.
Nonetheless, there are some variations between the original letter and this
version. For example, in some instances, non-substantive word refinements
have been made, and formatting has been adjusted to conform to LAW
REVIEW presentation style and to ensure accuracy. These variations do not
change the meaning or substance of the Letter.
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RECONCILING RELIGIOUS FAITH
AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE:
THE PROBLEM OF THE ELUSIVE DEFINITION OF RELIGION
DANIEL A. SEEGER∗

Certain words and concepts, in spite of their common usage in daily
life, defy crisp and satisfying definition. What is art? What is a Christian
life? What is community? What is pornography? What is religion? There
adhere to these concepts elements of humanity’s evolving self-understanding, an awareness-expanding process which presumably will never
cease, and so pinning them down with neat, work-a-day definitions is both
impossible and frustrating.
Nevertheless, as Jeffrey Omar Usman observes in his excellent article
“Defining Religion” (North Dakota Law Review, Volume 83, Number 1),
the courts must act even though their definition of something like religion
will never be perfect. After an insightful survey of the difficulties inherent
in church/state jurisprudence, Usman offers seven governing principles
which he feels will advance coherence and justice in this area of law, and
includes in his recommendations a retreat from the broad definition of
religion set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the case of United
States of America v. Daniel A. Seeger.
Usman’s analysis is very useful, and I have no wish to refute it. I am
writing in response to my belief that his seven point summary does not do
justice to the deft and insightful discussion with which he introduces it. In
seeking to define parameters governing the concept of religion so that
courts can proceed with the practical tasks their functioning requires,
Usman acknowledges that it is impossible to avoid some degree of imperfection, but I believe he makes a few more concessions to imperfection than
are absolutely necessary. I do agree with Usman, however, that some
element of imperfection is inevitable.
Before offering a modification of Usman’s seven points, it is necessary
to elaborate somewhat on his preceding analysis.

∗

Since being respondent in the case of United States v. Seeger, the author has worked for the
Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). He has served as Executive Director of the American
Friends Service Committee’s New York Regional Office, and as Executive Director of Pendle
Hill, a Quaker center for study and contemplation in Wallingford, Pennsylvania.
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The Secular Origins of American Constitutional Government
Although the founders of the Republic may have had varying attitudes
toward the then-prevailing religious cultures, and some may have derived
their idea of the separation of church and state from their own religious
philosophies, the overwhelming historical evidence would seem to indicate
that the essential principles upon which our nation was founded did not
spring from any religious culture. Rather, religious cultures adopted them
and adapted to them, both because these principles became increasingly
popular in their own right, and because they offered relief from the sort of
religious strife that characterized European history up until the Treaty of
Westphalia and the Age of the Enlightenment. Concepts of the Rights of
Man (sic), the social contract theory of government, and the idea of the
separation of governmental powers did not arise out of Jewish or Christian
or Muslim culture over the many hundreds years they had available to
discover them.
Rather, in the eighteenth century, a new spirit of science and
empiricism, an affinity for rationalism, skepticism about progress-impeding
superstitions inherited from the past, and rebellion in the face of despotism,
generated a philosophical and political movement of great power and
insight. It inspired many of the key founders of the United States, most of
whom, although they did not reject the earlier religious traditions outright,
were very skeptical of their historic institutional forms, their frequent
apologetics for monarchy, and their intolerance and superstition, which
often led to violence and oppression.
While many people who lived in the colonies during the Revolutionary
period were devout Christians, they had to look beyond Christianity to
invent the constitutional Republic we enjoy. In fact, one might argue that
their Christianity was an impediment to their seeing the way forward to free
speech, the rights of a free press, and religious toleration. Hinduism is
arguably a way of life that honors diversity in religious belief and practice.
But it could not be argued, on the basis 1700 years of Christian history at
the time of the American Revolution, that the concepts upon which our
Republic was founded, including the separation of Church and State, had
occurred to very many Christians. As Columbus set sail for America, less
than two hundred years before the drafting of the United States
Constitution, Jews and Muslims were being driven from Spain. Martin
Luther’s relentless diatribes against Jews are well known. As late as 1864
the papal encyclical Quanta Cura condemned as insanity (deliramentum)
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the view that liberty of conscience was a universal right that ought to exist
in every well-governed state.
The frequent assertion that there is something innately Christian about
the American form of government is simply a false and misleading reading
of history. Most eighteenth century Christians who came to see religious
toleration as an aspect of their faith were responding to cultural influences
from outside of Christianity. The Quakers, and perhaps a few other
marginalized sects, were the only exception to this. Most Christians have
come to reconcile democratic practice with their faith and now see the two
as inextricably linked. But to project this linkage back to earlier centuries is
an error.
The power of the ideas from secular culture upon which the United
States was founded can evoke a religious-like devotion. As we are
frequently reminded, many have fought and died to preserve our democratic
way of life in a way they presumably would not have done to preserve the
French or English monarchies, both sanctioned by the religious authorities
of their day. As has also frequently been observed, the Marxist movement,
atheist in its metaphysics, nevertheless practiced rituals and inspired devotion that had a religious-like quality among its adherents.
The term “religious belief” may once have been loosely sufficient to
describe those aspects of personhood, which were so sacred as to be placed
beyond the reach of any governmental intrusion, even if supported by a
democratic majority, under a social contract theory of communal organization. But clearly in today’s world such “ultimate concerns,” while
functioning in people’s lives as religion once did, are no longer confined to
religion as opposed to philosophy. Those founders whom Usman cites who
sought to include atheists under the mantle of the protection of freedom of
religion had at least some glimmering of this reality. Americans who
volunteered to fight in the Spanish Civil War against Franco were presumably responding to a “religious-like” devotion to democratic principles;
their sacrifices can hardly be dismissed as “merely” philosophical.
Usman’s article mentions Buddhism once or twice, but does not dwell
on that significant component of religious culture. Buddhism is frequently
dismissed by some Christians as “merely a philosophy” rather than a
religion because of the professed agnosticism of Suddhartha Gautama,
Buddhism’s founder. Yet can we believe that any sensible expression of
American democratic practice would afford Buddhism, adhered to by about
one-eighth of the human race, any less freedom or protection than the other
major religions? It is no longer possible to establish a bright line between
religion and philosophy in cases where philosophy fundamentally orients a
person to his or her essential human nature and selfhood, if ever it was.
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Was Socrates’ acceptance of his death sentence, when he could easily have
escaped, a religious act? Even though Patrick Henry referred from time to
time to a deity, when he cried “Give me liberty or give me death,” was this
a philosophical statement or a religious statement? Could it have plausibly
been derived from Christianity as it was known in that day? Up until that
time, many religious people had suffered martyrdom for specific religious
dogmas or ideas, but few had done it for a generalized idea of human
liberty.
If there is to be a single definition of religion which must cover both
the non-establishment and free exercise provisions of the First Amendment,
as Usman persuasively argues there should be, surely it must be such as to
protect the rights of people who hold to systems of thought and to practices
which are largely congruent with or parallel to conventional religious
beliefs in respect to the way they function in the life and self-identity of the
citizen.
Richard Dawkins, the well-known geneticist who recently
published the book The God Delusion, were he an American, would have
the right to be afforded the same measure of protection for his views about
religion as anyone else, even though he explicitly denies that there is any
“reality beyond the ordinary,” to use a phrase from one of Usman’s
concluding parameters. Nor would merely affording Dawkins the right of
free speech alone be sufficient protection from other imaginable
impositions that might be made upon him in the name of religion.
The Prophetic Voice in Religious Life
Obviously, very broad definitions of religion raise the specter of the
many practical difficulties which might arise if the courts had to deal on a
case-by-case basis with “one-person religions.” Every individual can have
his or her own unique but profoundly felt religious views. Every home or
tent where a person meditates on the mysteries of life might claim itself to
be a sanctuary.
But alas, this difficulty cannot be so easily dismissed by appeals to
practicality. For the great moments in religious history revolve exactly
around such solitary spirits in their tents. Lao-Tzu, reportedly disillusioned
by the failure of anyone in society to respond to his teaching, exiled himself
to a cave hermitage and wrote a scripture that eventually became a key
foundation of Chinese civilization. Siddhartha was meditating quite alone
under a fig tree, abandoned even by his very small handful of followers,
when he achieved enlightenment. Jesus, after his baptism by John, spent
time alone in the desert before beginning his public ministry. Mohammed,
too, retired to a cave hermitage where he received his first, and many of his
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subsequent, religious visions. We might also include Moses with his
burning bush and on Mount Sinai. Francis of Assisi, deemed delusional by
his family and acquaintances, was praying alone in a ruined and abandoned
church when a voice from the decaying crucifix spoke to him: “Go, Francis,
and repair my house, which is everywhere in ruins.” Only later was this
message properly understood as referring to the spiritual fabric of the entire
institution of the church, and not merely to the physical condition of the
particular lonely edifice in which Francis heard the voice.
In fact, practically all these great spiritual visionaries were to some
degree or another regarded as mad with respect to the cultural milieu in
which they existed.
In our own day, when a great turning of the ages is occurring, when the
old ways of doing things have exhausted themselves, when humankind is in
the process of destroying the very planet which sustains life itself, when the
mal-distribution of wealth and power eclipses that which prevailed at the
time of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, is not the time ripe for a
deliverer? And is American legal practice to disallow the traditional
dynamic through which solitary but prophetic religious visionaries emerge?
Paul Tillich’s Concept of “Ultimate Concern”
More theologically oriented or philosophically inclined people may
have their way of life organized coherently into a neat hierarchy of concerns
which endures over years. In such cases it might be easy to identify an
“ultimate” concern deserving religious freedom protections, even though no
appeal to a supernatural agent may be involved.
Usman challenges the usefulness of Tillich’s term “ultimate concern”
when defining religion because most people experience life with a variety
of competing and conflicting concerns, and so no “ultimate” one can be
identified.
Admittedly most people, as they proceed through life, resonate to a
rather loose baggage of ideas which may or may not be coherent. This is
true of church-goers as well as of the unchurched. But this commonplace
carelessness does not mean that Tillich’s expectation that a religion should
be an ultimate concern which one takes seriously without reservation is
inapplicable to situations where religious freedom is at issue. Once
challenged, one’s clarity about what is more or less important in life may be
substantially enhanced. The word “ultimate” in most of its meanings
implies a singularity, the top of a hierarchy. Yet as a practical matter one
may have several areas of transcendent concern—one’s family, one’s
religion, one’s political freedom, the safety and independence of one’s
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nation, the fate of the earth—without necessarily being impelled to arrange
them hierarchically, except if one is forced into a choice by a tyrannical
outside agency. Tillich’s use of the term “ultimate” may be infelicitous, but
the idea behind it is practical and useful in terms of identifying a certain
quality of which we expect religious beliefs to give evidence.
Protecting the Rights of Both Very Small and Very Substantial
Religious Minorities
Before attempting a refinement of Usman’s seven parameters, one last
preliminary observation needs to be made.
Even if we arrive at a unitary definition of religion which applies
equally effectively to issues of non-establishment and free exercise, there is
a profound practical issue involving whether or not the non-establishment
question or the free exercise question pertains to a small minority, or
whether it pits very substantial portions of the population against each
other. Whether a Native American group may use controlled substances in
religious ceremonies, whether Amish people may be excused from
secondary education, or whether the Church of Scientology should be
granted tax exempt status are questions deserving of careful scrutiny in the
interest of justice both for the minority involved and for mainstream
society. Both parties have a profound interest in a regime of law that is
coherent and just. But granting First Amendment protections to the
minority is not apt materially to discommode those with mainstream views,
although it may stretch their capacities for toleration.
But very substantial problems arise when the issue of religious freedom
pits large segments of society against each other. The teaching of evolution
in public schools based on theories derived from Charles Darwin, the
practice of universal access to abortion, the treatment and rights of gay and
lesbian people, and the protocols associated with death and dying are issues
where it seems that honoring the rights of religious conscience of some
people profoundly violates the rights of religious conscience of others. Our
approach to defining religion must somehow take account of these
problems, although it cannot be expected to solve them. But it also should
not exacerbate them or make them more intractable.
One interesting aspect of these conflicts is that the religious vocabulary
is often asymmetrical. That is, one position tends to be based on traditionalist religious vocabulary much more clearly and self-consciously than the
other side. People opposed to extending civil rights and marriage rites to
gay and lesbian people, for example, are much more apt to cite conventional
religious conviction or texts as the basis of their concern than are people
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who support extending these rights to homosexuals. Although the pro-gay
and pro-lesbian movement may include people who are motivated by an
interpretation of religious principles and tradition, most are apt to base their
convictions on arguments derived from social contract theory and from
philosophical or Constitutional principles. Are they therefore unworthy of
constitutional protection from the intrusive imposition upon them of the
religious views of others?
A similar lack of symmetry occurs with respect to abortion. Most
opponents of abortion cite religious conviction, while most proponents of
free choice cite philosophical concerns about the rights of women and the
appropriate limits to the reach of government into intimate private and
personal affairs. Pro-choice proponents cite a distinction to be made between an early term fetus and a developed human being, a distinction which
abortion opponents do not see.
No one is required to have an abortion. So the legalization of abortion
does not directly inhibit the religious freedom of those opposed to it. But
the religious convictions of abortion opponents require them to seek to
employ the powers of government to prevent anyone from having an abortion, except perhaps in very limited circumstances. Should they succeed in
accomplishing this, it is hard not to see how this is not an establishment of
religion in that it requires everyone to conform to the religious convictions
of some even though they do not share them.
This is not the place to try to resolve the dilemmas that abortion, the
movement for gay and lesbian rights, and euthanasia pose. But it is relevant
to observe that there are significant areas of human experience where the
terrain occupied by the traditionalist religious convictions of one person is
quite congruent with the terrain occupied by the philosophical convictions
of another person, as far as their innermost concept of their humanity and
self-identity is concerned. To enforce through law a hierarchical preference
for the traditionalist religious views of some over the primary and
fundamental philosophical views of others is, in effect, to establish religion.
Usman’s Seven Parameters Guiding the Definition of Religion
We are now ready to refine Usman’s seven parameters for determining
the boundaries within which to find a definition of religion.
1) The first principle—that the courts cannot avoid defining
religion—is unaffected by the foregoing argument.
2) Similarly, the idea that the courts should avoid defining
religion one way for establishment questions and another
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material above.
3) Usman’s third and sixth principles are closely related.
a) Usman’s argument is that a definition of religion based
on Tillich’s concept of “ultimate concern,” upon which
the Supreme Court relied in the Seeger case, demands
that every person who might draw the attention of the
courts on First Amendment questions needs to have a
precise hierarchy of convictions so that one of these at the
very summit can be identified as “ultimate,” and therefore
“religious.” He properly recognizes that this intellectual
and spiritual orderliness is an unreasonable expectation
for most people. But I believe Usman’s conclusion that
the courts’ use of the “ultimate concern” concept is
unworkable is wrong and stems from an over-reading of
the language. The concept that a religious belief should
have a sort of primordial importance to a person’s selfdefinition as a human being does not necessarily imply
unawareness that life as it is actually lived involves a
variety of “ultimate” or “transcendent” concerns, even
though many of the meanings attributed to these two
words imply singularity. A person might be willing to
give up his life for his family, his country, or his religion,
for example. Thus, each is an “ultimate” concern in the
sense intended by Tillich and by the courts.
b) Usman further argues that Tillich’s “ultimate concern”
definition is too capacious in that it would admit as
religion any intensely held concern—he uses a preoccupation with gathering wealth, which consumes some
people’s entire spirit, energy and attention, or gathering
Star Trek memorabilia, as hypothetical examples. But the
Court’s concept that an “ultimate concern” should be
analogous to, or parallel to, the functioning of religious
belief in the life of a traditional adherent certainly mitigates this difficulty somewhat, helping at least intuitively
to exclude the Star Trek or money-making preoccupations from the class of religious concerns. I do concede
that the Court’s language in the Seeger case, drawn from
Tillich, does suffer somewhat from imprecision regarding
a clear boundary or limiting principle.
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Usman seeks to correct for this in his sixth parameter. But, unfortunately, in so doing he veers back towards a supernaturalist notion of a
Supreme Being as a necessary component of the beliefs of anyone seeking
First Amendment non-establishment or free exercise protection, although
Usman avoids using Supreme Being language. Thus, he says that the belief
or practice in question should be imposed by an authority that is “part of
some reality or understanding that is beyond the ordinary.” Such authority
must be “sacred, that is not profane, and addressed to the fundamental questions of existence.” A distinction should also be drawn between philosophical and personal beliefs and religious beliefs, according to Usman. The
arguments made above explain why this is not a satisfactory approach.
There is a more useful direction to look for a definition of religion, one
which acknowledges the constitutional imperative to protect the freedom
and liberty of both believers in and non-believers in supernaturalism. It
assumes that the First Amendment religious freedom clauses are meant not
only to protect some religious people from being tyrannized by people of
different religious views who might co-opt the powers of government to
enforce their way of life on all, but also to protect people with no religion
against intrusions which might be made in the name of some religions or of
all religions collectively.
The class of perspectives and beliefs which the First Amendment seeks
to protect through its non-establishment and free-exercise clauses have
three essential characteristics:
c) They contextualize the human estate within the wider
reality of which it is a part. For some people, like the
Buddha, we cannot know the furthest reaches of this
reality, cannot know if there is a deity, cannot know from
whence the world came into existence, and cannot know
about life after death. But we exist in an island of light in
which we can discern principles of lawfulness which are
eternal and inexhaustible, and to which we can resonate
through the practice of compassion and other virtues. To
materialists such as Dawkins, everything is susceptible to
scientific explanations, explanations which will eventually be discovered. This goes for the origins of the
universe, for the appearance and demise of vast galaxies
in the far reaches of space, for the generation from inanimate matter of life, including human life, and for the
explanation of human perceptions, thought, artistic
responses and emotions. For traditional Christians, Jews,
and Muslims an eternal, omnipotent, all-knowing, all
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merciful deity created the cosmos and has given us the
rules or principles by which we should live. What is
important is not the disparities among these views, but
the fact that they have in common that they establish a
relationship between the human estate and reality taken as
a whole.
d) People claiming First Amendment protections for their
practices or way of life should derive these practices or
way of life from such a cosmological perspective as is
described above, and have a recognizably coherent view
of why they see such a way of life as beneficent should it
come to be practiced by many people or by everybody.
This need not be persuasive to people of other perspectives to qualify for First Amendment protection. But it
should be discernable by an impartial court as having
coherence and credibility as a generalizable way of life as
understood in the mind of the adherent. A religious or
philosophical view which claimed special privileges for a
small elect would not qualify for protections under the
First Amendment, no matter how much supernatural
authority or philosophical proof such an elect claimed for
itself. In shorthand, the present discussion advocates
retaining definitions of religion which the courts have
derived from Paul Tillich and William James, while
disallowing the limiting ideas of institutionalism derived
from Emile Durkheim, and adding from Emmanuel Kant
the powerful concept of the categorical imperative.
e) Finally, the belief should be sincerely held and should
find reasonably consistent expression in the life of the
practitioner.
It is not argued that these limiting conditions are without difficulty. I
agree with Usman that absolute clarity in this area is elusive. The test of
sincerity, especially, can open a huge window for subjectivity. Yet no
definition of religion avoids this difficulty. The courts have long recognized that mere formal membership in a traditional religious denomination
does not mean a person’s belief in that denomination’s tenets is seriously,
deeply, or sincerely held. What is being argued here is that the use of the
above boundary conditions for areas of human experience meriting nonestablishment and free exercise protections under the First Amendment are
clearer and less ambiguous than are Usman’s, and they afford necessary
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protection for the range of modern views in the area of religion which
justifiably deserve it, even under an originalist reading of the Constitution.
4) Usman’s fourth parameter is not affected by any of the above
arguments. The courts cannot limit religious protections only
to those individuals or groups whose ideas the courts deem
socially constructive.
5) Regarding Usman’s fifth parameter, it is argued here that the
limiting conditions described above are sufficient to focus First
Amendment protections reasonably. And, as has been noted,
guaranteeing people freedom of speech does not in itself protect them from oppression in the name of another’s religious
beliefs. If one’s own life, liberty and pursuit of happiness was
contingent on persuading a majority out of its religious convictions, one might have to wait a very long time. Relying on
freedom of speech as an escape from non-establishment and
free-exercise difficulties is to concede to a tyranny of the
majority.
6) Usman’s sixth parameter, which would re-introduce “Supreme
Being-like” concepts into the law, has been addressed above.
7) Usman’s seventh parameter, proposing that the Courts define
religion cautiously but precisely, and then apply the result
consistently and fearlessly, is compatible with the analysis
above.
The practice of democracy assumes that reasonable and fair-minded
people, after a period of respectful discussion, will be led to enough shared
clarity and unity about the problems they face in their common life that a
way forward will be identified to which most can adhere.
Yet, as the apostle Paul correctly observes: “Faith is being sure of what
we hope for and certain of what we do not see.” (Hebrews 11:1—New
English Bible). It is hardly likely, therefore, that people of one faith in
things unseen will persuade others of their convictions within the time
frame required to decide issues of public policy. The dual aspect of
certainty and invisibility which characterize matters of faith puts democracy
to its greatest test, and it perhaps is not surprising to find ourselves in a
situation where church/state jurisprudence has a certain garbled character.
An expansive definition of religion such as is supported here may, at
first blush, seem to increase these difficulties by drawing into the sphere of
First Amendment jurisprudence many issues which a narrower definition of
religion would allow us to dismiss as “merely secular, philosophical or
personal” matters—matters subject to simple majority rule.
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But in the end, we must acknowledge that reticence about a defining
religion at all, or trying to define it very narrowly, will not make disappear
the difficulties which ensue from imposing the invisible and unprovable
religious certainties of some citizens on other citizens who do not agree
with them. Contemporary extremists in several faiths, some of whom occupy high public or ecclesiastical offices and others who come from the
radical fringes, have brought disrepute on religion and have elevated the
sensitivity of substantial portions of the population to their right not to be
tyrannized by those acting on the basis of unprovable propositions which
they do not share. To shrink from precision and boldness regarding the true
scope of these issues only accelerates our momentum towards a
constitutional crisis.
A clear and truthful definition of religion for First Amendment purposes, rather than worsening our difficulties, might actually lessen them.
Most Americans are inclined toward fair-mindedness on matters of religious toleration. Most have a clear view of the excesses and injustices which
have characterized religious history. Most understand the American experiment in constitutional government to be an attempt, at least in part, to
overcome the baleful effects of religious absolutism. Perhaps, if they could
see that some of the key issues which divide us today do indeed belong to
the class of difficulties which our commitment to democracy challenges us
to overcome, and indeed which our American form of constitutional
government was expressly designed to overcome, the onus of our efforts
with regard to these difficulties would be switched from futile attempts to
“win,” where in the nature of things, there can be no authentic victory, and
more toward finding an accommodation expressive of the same spirit
tolerance and generosity with which our nation was founded.
December 7, 2007

